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Abstract: In the digital era, information sharing is of 
utter importance to improving the quality and benefits 
of government services. At present, there is a lot of 
information housed by and distributed among different 
government agencies, which poses significant 
challenges and barriers to information sharing and 
dissemination. This paper presents a research model 
that examines some crucial factors, including 
administrative power, trust, perceived risk, and power 
games, that may affect information sharing in 
e-Government. The administrative power can be 
classified as coercive power and coordinated power. 
Trust, perceived risk, and power games are introduced 
as moderators of the power on information sharing in 
the research model. Results of our empirical study 
indicate that coercive power and coordinated power 
positively affect information sharing, and such effects 
are moderated by trust among employees and power 
ames. The research and practical implications of this 





In the digital era, e-government is getting more and 
more popular. Governments around the world are 
implementing innovative e-government systems in 
order to provide high-quality e-services [1]. 
E-government systems can enhance a government’s 
daily operations, optimize the service delivery, and 
decrease the operation cost. By taking advantage of the 
state-of-the-art information and communication 
technology, e-government can assist the innovation of 
governance processes and improvement of efficiency 
and effectiveness of government services, as well as 
provide citizens with more opportunities for actively 
engaging in government policy making and service 
activities [2]. It also provides a new channel for 
government officials to access information in and 
across government agencies. 
Information sharing can strengthen people's 
information consciousness, promote the development 
and adoption of e-government, and fasten the progress 
of government informatization. It can improve work 
efficiency, support managerial decision-making, and 
lower the administrative cost to satisfy the internal 
requirement of e-government construction. For 
example, sharing information could enable a service 
agency to access and use information owned by other 
collaborating agencies directly, which can significantly 
reduce the time and cost of searching and acquiring the 
needed information from external sources. Despite 
those benefits, information sharing is difficult to 
initiate or sustain [3]. Another topic in e-government 
field is knowledge sharing, which is defined as “the 
process through which one unit is affected by the 
experience of another” [4]. In this paper, we use these 
two terms information sharing and knowledge sharing 
interchangeably.  
There is an increasing emphasis on the importance of 
information sharing in public sectors [4-10]. The 
emerging information technologies enable the creation, 
collection, integration, management, and sharing of 
information and knowledge within and across agencies 
through the governmental networks or Internet. Many 
researchers have studied the influential factors of 
information sharing in the e-government context [3, 4, 
10]. Among them, organizational structure, technical 
barriers, and social culture are the most studied factors 
that impede information sharing. However, there has 
been little research about the impact of political factors, 
such as administrative power, on information sharing in 
the e-government context. 
One significant political barrier to information sharing 
is people’s tendency to protect the policymaking power 
of administrative agencies [3]. Power is viewed as a 
critical component that determines people’s 
information behavior, which can be explained in term 
of power relations existed in the processes that people 
are involved with [11]. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how power 
influences information sharing behavior in government 
agencies. Trust, perceived risk, and power games are 
expected to moderate the relation between power and 
information sharing. The research is conducted through 
a survey with employees from five national 
government agencies in China to elicit their opinions 
on how those factors influence their intention to share 
information. All of the selected government agencies 
have already established a reliable information 
technology infrastructure for e-government. And all of 
them use some kinds of information systems to 
communicate with others within and across different 
departments or to provide services to citizens. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section reviews the literature on information sharing in 
e-government and introduces the theoretical 
background of our research. Then, we present the 
research model and hypotheses, followed by 
introduction to the constructs and their validity. Next, 
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we discuss the data analysis and results. Finally, we 
conclude the paper with future research directions. 
 
Literature Review 
According to Dawes[3], information sharing is often 
limited by technical, organizational, and political 
barriers. It’s very important for government agencies to 
conduct information sharing effectively by using 
computer and network technologies. As Bellamy [6] 
points out, the willingness and capacity to share 
information among local agencies responsible for 
governmental services are considered as the sine qua 
non of effective management of cases, the efficient use 
of resources, and the prevention of unacceptable 
outcomes. But there are so many cases where 
information is not shared when it should be, causing 
devastating results.  
Many scholars have investigated information sharing 
among government departments from a variety of 
aspects. In particular, organizational factors [12, 13], 
technical factors [14, 15], and cultural factors [16] are 
the three most examined factors found to influence 
people’s information sharing behavior. 
The organizational characteristics of public 
organizations are different from private organizations. 
Compared with private organizations, public 
organizations are composed of multiple and competing 
interests [17]. Kim and Lee [12, 15] explored how 
three organizational dimensions, including 
organizational culture, organizational structure, and 
information technology, influenced knowledge sharing 
capabilities in government agencies. They found three 
constructs in the organizational context, social network, 
performance-based reward systems, and IT 
infrastructure and application are positively associated 
with the level of employee knowledge sharing 
capabilities. Willem [4] discussed the organizational 
characteristics of public sector organizations, and 
focused on specific characteristics of public sector 
organizations that would increase or limit 
interdepartmental information sharing.  Three types of 
organization-specific coordination mechanisms, the 
member’s social identification, and trust are proposed 
and proved to affect the information sharing capability. 
An information technology infrastructure is essential to 
information sharing. It is also recognized as a basic 
obstacle to inspiring information sharing. Landsbergen 
and Wolken [14] suggest that interoperability requires 
sharing information. They propose an integrated 
federal and state government system architecture that 
coordinates legal, regulatory, policy, and managerial 
approaches to promote inter-department information 
sharing. Kim [15] also finds the significant, positive 
impact of information technology on information 
sharing.  
Social culture is another frequent examined factor 
affecting information sharing. Drake [16] identified 
and integrated three subcultures within the public 
sector (scientist, politician, and bureaucrat) as a 
framework to examine information sharing. Keith and 
Alan [18] explored employees’ beliefs and attitudes 
toward sharing organizational information. They 
proposed a model that defined the influence on one’s 
intention to share information based on the theory of 
reasoned action. Shin [19] investigated the influence of 
cultural factors on information sharing in China. It was 
postulated that social network structures such as guanxi, 
Confucian dynamism, and the level of collectivism 
could determine the degree of information sharing [19]. 
Grounded in the political and economic environment of 
China, some authors also proposed several research 
models to investigate the factors influencing 
information sharing in Chinese governments. For 
example, Hu [20] investigated some local government 
divisions of China, and proposed that the resources, the 
driving force, and the cognitions of information sharing 
be the main factors that influence inter-government 
information sharing. Fan [21] argues that external 
environment, inter-agency partnership, organizational 
readiness, and individual expectation are four factors 
influencing the degree of realization and the actual 
result of information sharing. 
Although the prior studies have examined the 
influential factors of information sharing in 
e-government from a number of perspectives, 
especially from organization, technology, and culture 
aspects, the research on the relationship between 
political factors and information sharing is still rare. As 
one of the essential political factors, power is 
considered to affect the information behavior directly 
[11]. However, it remains unclear whether and how the 
power relation among employees affects information 
sharing behavior significantly. In addition, most prior 
studies were conducted in western developed countries. 
China is a developing country, and it possesses some 
unique culture and government characteristics. Aiming 
to fill the above knowledge gaps, this study explores 
the influence of power relation on e-government 
information sharing in China. 
Researchers in the information systems discipline have 
suggested that there would be a relationship between 
information and power [11, 22]. The possession of a lot 
of information can also be a source of power [23]. 
Furthermore, researchers have also shown that power, 
as a pivotal factor, influences people’s information 
behavior [11]. For example, power could determine 
people’s motivation to share and the direction of 
information flows [24]. 
Power is exercised and exists in the actions of 
information sharing. Although some researchers [25, 
26] propose that the power may affect people’s 
intention to share information, the quantitative and 
systematic evidence does not exist. This paper will 
explore how power affects the e-government 
information sharing, what is the difference between 
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coercive power and coordinated power’s influence on 
information sharing, and what moderates such 
influe ce in Chinese e-government context.  n
 
Research Model and Hypotheses 
Development 
Classification of Power 
Power is an elusive concept that has a variety of 
meanings but without a universally accepted definition. 
Farace [27] regards power as a relation between forces 
that exists only in relationships. French and Raven [28] 
define power as the ability of the management to 
influence behavior, intentions, attitudes, beliefs, 
emotions, or values of subordinates. Alternatively, 
power can also be seen as a personal trait, or as a 
consequence of position within a hierarchy [29]. 
Extant literature has classified power according to 
sources or bases, which are referred to as power bases. 
The most common classification scheme of power 
bases is proposed by Raven [30], which includes 
coercive, expert, legitimate, referent, and reward power. 
Coercive power is based on the target’s belief that the 
manager has the ability to punish employees; expert 
power is based on the target’s belief that the manager 
can provide him or her with special knowledge; 
legitimate power is based on the target’s perception 
that the manager has the legitimate right to influence 
the target and that he or she is obligated to comply; 
referent power is based on the target’s identification 
with or desire to be associated with the manager; and 
reward power is based on the target’s belief that the 
manager has the ability to provide him or her with 
desired tangible or intangible objectives. 














Hunt and Nevin [31] classified various power sources 
into coercive and non-coercive (coordinated) sources. 
Among Raven’s five powers, the coercive power is 
distinct from others because it alone involves potential 
punishment. The other four powers are non-coercive 
sources of power, because an individual willingly 
yields power to another. Hunt and Nevin proposed a 
model of power and established a franchise channel of 
distribution to demonstrate the validity of the coercive 
and non-coercive urces of power [31]. 
Because it is meaningful to dichotomize various power 
sources into coercive and non-coercive sources, and the 
existing literature points out the extreme difficulty in 
empirically differentiating various non-coercive 
sources of power [31, 32], this paper will adopt the 
power classification model of Hunt and Nevin. 
 
Research Model and Hypotheses 
Based on extensive literature review, the research 
model is shown in Figure 1. 
Power is regarded as a pervasive phenomenon in many 
aspects of individual lives, including the aspects 
emanating from work roles performed by individuals 
[11]. When investigating information sharing among 
government agencies, there will always be power 
issues involved. If the power is exercised properly, it 
would promote the successful implementation of 
information sharing. Conversely, the abuse of power 
will hinder information sharing. Coercive power and 
coordinated power have significant impact on the 
majority of knowledge acquisition attributes and are 
likely to affect employees’ knowledge sharing. While 
being considered in the relationship across public 
agencies, power implies that one agency has the ability 
to affect the decisions of others [33]. Chia-chen Wang 
[26] investigated the inter-organizational relationship 
in the manufacture industry in Taiwan, and argued that 
regardless of the source of power-coercive punishments 
or non-coercive rewards, power would increase the 
level of information sharing. In e-government, the 
partners of an agency might ask the agency to share 
information, and the agency would be forced to share it 
because of the inter-organizational relationship, 
agreement, the expected benefit, and the possible 
punishments or legal actions. Hence we propose the 
first two hypotheses as follows: 
H1: The coercive power is positively associated with 
information sharing in e-government. 
H2: The coordinated power is positively associated 
with information sharing in e-government. 
Trust is a person’s willingness to depend on and belief 
in his/her collaborators. Trust will help organizations 
establish and maintain a long-term cooperation relation 
[10]. Kim [15] proposed that trust in organizational 
culture would promote active knowledge sharing 
among employees and that trustworthy behavior 
would fasten communication by empowering 
coworkers to freely share personal knowledge. High 
levels of employee trust can lead to better knowledge 
sharing. Panteli [34] studied the relation between 
power and trust in virtual teams. He examined the 
power effect in high- and low-trust global virtual 
teams. Results revealed that in high-trust teams, power 
shifted among team members and the power 
differentials were minimized. The developed trust 
minimizes the use of power in pursuit of a 
collaborative and productive relationship. Yeung [35] 
examined the influence and interaction effect of 
coercive power and trust on supplier integration. He 
 so
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posited that the use of power would increase internal 
integration with a higher level of trust. Furthermore, 
internal integration mainly concerns the integration of 
employees, information flow, and processes from 
different functions within a company.  
In e-government, a higher level of trust can motivate 
agencies to invest in inter-agency collaboration. Such 
investment can be viewed as a commitment to the 
relationship [35]. The information providers believe 
that the information requester will not take advantage 
of them through opportunistic behaviors. In such a 
situation, when the requester asks providers to share 
information through the use of power, no matter if it is 
coercive power or coordinated power, it will be 
considered as a suggestion that is beneficial to all 
parties. Thus the providers will accept the suggestion 
and take actions. Although the requesters use power to 
affect providers, the providers prefer to share 
information because organizational studies have shown 
that there is a mitigating effect of trust on people’s 
reactions to unfavorable exchange outcomes [36]. As a 
result, the use of power will be looked upon as a driver 
for information sharing in the trust-based relationship. 
However, if providers do not trust requesters, the 
requesters’ use of power on providers’ internal 
decisions will be viewed as attempts for future 
opportunistic behaviors. This will actually damage the 
relationship and decrease the providers’ intention to 
share information. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H3a: The level of trust among employees would 
positively affect the impact of coercive power on 
information sharing in e-government. 
H3b: The level of trust among employees would 
positively affect the impact of coordinated power on 
information sharing in e-government. 
Risk is typically defined in terms of the trustor’s belief 
about the likelihood of gains and losses [37, 38]. 
Because it is difficult to measure risk objectively, the 
literature pays more attention on the perception of risk. 
Perceived risk is defined as the people’s subjective 
expectation of suffering a loss in pursuit of a desired 
outcome [39]. Perceived risk is caused by behavioral 
and environmental uncertainty. Behavioral uncertainty 
exists because online service providers may behave in 
an opportunistic manner by taking advantage of the 
impersonal nature of the electronic environment, while 
environmental uncertainty arises due to the 
unpredictable nature of Internet-based technology that 
is beyond the control of consumers. 
Research on e-commerce has suggested that the higher 
perceived risk will mitigate the users’ intention to share 
information and complete transactions [38]. The 
perceive risk is also found to have the similar negative 
effect on e-government adoption [39, 40]. Once 
employees of a government organization perceive the 
existence of a risk, they will feel anxious and be afraid 
to be responsible for information leakiness. The higher 
the perceived risk, the less the information sharing. 
When people are asked to share information, they will 
determine the degree of risk, including requesters’ 
possible opportunistic behavior and the uncontrolled 
information technology. If the perceived risk exceeds 
the impact of power, they prefer to retain the 
information rather than share it. Thus, the following 
hypotheses are derived. 
H4a: Increased perceived risk could weaken the impact 
of coercive power on information sharing in 
e-government. 
H4b: Increased perceived risk could weaken the impact 
of coordinated power on information sharing in 
e-government. 
Power games refer to the unjustified use of power for 
personal reasons, for instance, to enrich oneself or 
one’s department or to increase one’s control in the 
organization [4]. It is important to highlight that 
information is becoming the source of power in the 
current digital era and this power moves to the 
information source [34, 41]. Those who possess or 
have access to certain information can use it to further 
their interests. The use of the metaphor “information is 
power” demonstrates the influence of information on 
the power shift process [11]. In the information sharing 
process, such power games can be used for hoarding 
one’s information. If employees get the feeling that the 
power is lost in the ongoing process, their belief in the 
sharing efforts will fade out. But most government 
employees think the information exchange will 
enhance their knowledge and improve their problem 
solving ability. At the same time, their information 
belongs to the government. They will not lose any 
power after the sharing. The more information sharing, 
the more chance they could have. In the presence of 
power games, government employees know 
collaborator’s reaction for their information hiding 
behavior. They don’t want to ruin the relationship. If 
government employees know how to maximize the 
benefit from information sharing, they would like to 
exchange information in the presence of power games. 
So we propose the final hypotheses as follows: 
H5a: Power games will positively affect the impact of 
coercive power on information sharing in 
e-government. 
H5b: Power games will positively affect the impact of 





We developed a survey instrument to measure the 
proposed constructs for examining the underlying 
factors that may contribute to the intention toward 
information sharing. Questions were compiled and 
adapted from validated instruments used in the 
literature to measure each construct, and wording was 
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modified to fit the Chinese e-government context. 
Specifically, items for coercive power(CP) and 
coordinated power (NCP) were adopted/extended from 
Brown’s study [42]; items for trust (T) and the 
intention to information sharing (IS) were adapted from 
Kim’s study [15]; perceived risk (PR) was adapted 
from Fu [43]; items for power games (PG) were 
adopted from Willem [4]. Each item was rated using a 
seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating strongly 
disagree and 7 indicating strongly agree. 
In order to assess the construct validity of the various 
items, we attempt to identify any particular items that 
may be ambiguous through three ways: expert review, 
item sorting, and a pilot study.  
In the expert review and item sorting stages, we invited 
two groups of experts separately to discuss their 
understanding of those questionnaire items and 
comment on whether those items can accurately reflect 
the theoretical constructs or not. The first panel of 
experts included four professors from different Chinese 
universities. They are familiar with the survey research 
methodology and have been engaging in e-government 
information sharing research. The experts in the second 
group were managers from different government 
agencies with a clear idea about the current status of 
information sharing in e-government. According to the 
results of the review and sorting, we removed some 
question items that were reported to be indigestible, 
ambiguous, and difficult to represent the constructs. 
For example, an original question “relationships 
between people of different units can be rather 
strained” was excluded from the construct of power 
games. In addition to evaluating question items, experts 
also helped us double check the format of the original 
questionnaire, including a variety of statements and 
time limits for the questionnaire. 
A pilot test was then conducted with MPA (Master of 
Public Administration) students in a Chinese university 
to ensure that the instrument had acceptable reliability 
and validity. The selected MPA students were working 
as public servants in government agencies and they had 
good knowledge and understanding about information 
sharing in e-government. We used SPSS to check the 
reliabilities and conducted confirmatory factory 
analysis. All constructs in the pilot test showed 
satisfactory internal consistency. In this study, each 
alpha are higher than 0.6, the recommended threshold 
value [44]. Except power game, all alpha value exceed 
the recommended minimum acceptable level of 0.70 
[45]. Moreover, we performed confirmatory factory 
analysis to measure convergent and discriminant 
validity of the items. In this analysis, some items 
showed weak loadings. They should be higher than 0.5 
[46]. Finally, seven incongruent items were eliminated. 
The final survey included six constructs and 
twenty-two items, as well as demographic and 
self-re orted usage items.  p
 
Participants 
For the research project, the target population was the 
staff members of public government organizations in 
China that have established some kinds of 
e-government systems with a basic information sharing 
platform and IT infrastructure. In order to choose 
appropriate organizations, we visited several Chinese 
ministries and interviewed their IT managers to ensure 
the selected organizations met our requirements. 
Finally, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, National Development 
and Reform Commission, General Administration of 
Customs, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security were chosen as target organizations for the 
questionnaire distribution. They all have a good IT 
infrastructure and some kinds of e-government 
information systems operated to streamline the service 
processes across different departments.  
From the departments and the employee list of selected 
ministries, the first author and the contact persons at 
each ministry, who are most IT managers of the 
ministry, selected a number of potential participants to 
send the survey questionnaire. The candidates must 
have involved in some types of information collection, 
storage, processing, or dissemination. They should also 
have the experience with sharing information through 
some kinds of information systems. A total of 395 
surveys were delivered to the identified participants in 
five ministries by email in April 2010. In order to 
improve the return rate, we offered a gift valued US$10 
to each respondent. Furthermore, ten respondents were 
randomly selected to be rewarded a $80 cash bonus. 
At last, 182 questionnaires were returned (46.1 percent 
response rate). Eight of them were discarded because 
they were incomplete, resulting in 174 usable 
questionnaires. Fifty-nine percent of the participants 
were male. Age of participants ranged from 22 to 60 
years old, and sixty-six percent of the participants were 
between 25 and 34 years old. The years of 
governmental working experience ranged from 1 to 30 
years, and most respondents have worked in 
government organizations for 2 ~ 5 years. Regarding 
respondents’ job position, thirty-nine percent were 
staffs responsible for the daily operation; fifty-nine 
percent were middle-level managers in a ministry 
department; and two percent were department directors 




Means and standard deviations of constructs are 
reported in Table 1. The value range of the variables is 
between 1.0 and 7.0. In order to compute descriptive 
statistics, multiple-item scales were averaged. 
Cronbach’s alpha estimates of constructs are reported 
in Table 2.  The alpha value of the whole 
questionnaire is 0.768, and most of the constructs also 
have a alpha value exceeds the recommended 
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minimum acceptable level of 0.70 [45]. That means the 
questionnaire has a good internal consistency. 
 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
NCP 5.13  1.45 
CP 4.47  1.64 
T 5.21  1.25 
PR 4.28  1.58 
PG 5.45  1.32 
IS 5.23  1.42 
 
Table 2. Cronbach’s Alpha Values 
Variable Items Cronbach’s α 
NCP 3 0.702 
CP 5 0.780 
T 4 0.798 
PR 4 0.792 
PG 2 0.669 
IS 4 0.632 
 
Measurement model 
The principal component analysis was conducted to 
assess convergent and discriminant validities of the 
multi-dimensional constructs.  The 22 items used to 
measure 6 research variables were subjected to 
principal component analysis with varimax rotation. 
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy was 0.71, confirming the appropriateness of 
proceeding with the analyses. Factors with Eigen 
values larger than one were extracted, resulting in six 
factors. Table 3 presents the result of the principal 
components analysis. 
Convergent validity assesses the consistency across 
multiple operationalizations. As shown in Table 3, all 
estimated standard loadings of items on the expected 
factor are larger than 0.5, suggesting good convergent 
validity [47]. Moreover, discriminant validity 
represents the extent to which different constructs 
diverge from one another. As shown in Table 3, most 
items have standard loadings lower than 0.4 on 
constructs they were not supposed to measure, 
indicating good discriminant validity [47]. 
 
Regression Analysis 
We ran multiple regression analyses to test the 
hypotheses. Coordinated power and coercive power 
were independent variables, and information sharing 
was the dependent variable. Trust, perceived risk, and 
power games were moderator variables. The moderator 
variables will affect the independent variables’ 
influence on dependent variables. Such moderating 
effect is also referred to as interaction effects in 
regression analysis. The interaction effect is 
represented as the product of the independent variable 
and moderator variable. 
 
Table 3. Results of Principal 
Component Analysis 
Factor Items
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NCP1 .179 -.059 .237 -.044 .827 -.026
NCP2 .084 .066 .162 .132 .815 -.152
NCP3 .120 -.139 .072 .449 .558 .045
CP1 .817 .028 .046 -.051 .049 .089
CP2 .841 .094-.045 -.178 .102 .011
CP3 .683 .024 .067 .166 .129 .146
CP4 .556 .074 .151 .293 .233 .299
CP5 .580 .147-.008 .144 .007 -.150
T1 .019 -.070 .816 .140 .030 -.047
T2 .018 -.054 .820 .052 .215 -.106
T3 .080 -.029 .801 .048 .060 -.077
T4 .021 .060 .653 .093 .176 .240
PR1 .143 .745 -.048 -.045-.155 .085
PR2 .115 .763 -.080 .002 .062 .067
PR3 .173 .830 -.070 .018 .031 -.014
PR4 -.135 .786 .101 -.119-.016 .026
PG1 .053 .063-.041 -.049-.122 .851
PG2 .114 .068-.006 .056-.022 .843
IS1 .130 -.300 .310 .550 .035 .045
IS2 .016 -.197 .110 .797 .169 -.034
IS3 .077 .218 .023 .746 .026 -.011
IS4 .422 -.036 .075 .508-.001 .081
 
The regression model is derived as follows: 
ISi=β0+θ1NCPi+θ2CPi+β1Ti+β2PRi+β3PGi 
+γ1NCPTi+γ2NCPPRi+γ3NCPPGi 
+τ1CPTi+τ2CPPRi+τ3CPPGi+εI              (1) 
where i represents the subject i, and β,θ,γ and τ are 
predicted parameters; ε is the random error; NCPT is 
the product of NCP and T; NCPPR is the product of 
NCP and PR; NCPPG is the product of NCP and PG; 
CPT is the product of CP and T; CPPR is the product 
of CP and PR; CPPG is the product of CP and PG. 
We used the Hierarchical Multiple Regression method 
to analyze the collected data. In the first phase, only for 
the analysis in which sharing information was the 
dependent variable, two independent variables, namely 
coordinated power and coercive power, were entered in 
a hierarchy. We refer this model as Model 1. Then, the 
Model 2 added trust, perceived risk, and power games 
as independent variables that influence the information 
sharing intention. The third stage included the 
interaction effect between coordinated power and 
moderator variables. Finally, the Model 4 considered 
the interaction effect between coercive power and 
moderator variables based on Model 3. Table 4 shows 
the multiple regression analysis results for the four 
models. 
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Table 4. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
NCP 0.248** 0.198** 0.235** 0.246**
CP 0.187** 0.204** 0.240** 0.223**
T － 0.153 0.209 0.173 
PR － -0.098 -0.125 -0.145 
PG － 0.067 0.104 0.103 
Moderating Effect 
NCP*T － － 0.227** 0.203**
NCP*PR － － -0.035 -0.070 
NCP*PG － － 0.205* 0.202*
CP*T － － － 0.073 
CP*PR － － － 0.071 
CP*PG － － － 0.026 
F 14.668 7.663 6.646 4.914 
R2（adjusted） 0.163 0.194 0.247 0.238 
Note: N=174; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Based on the above results, hypotheses H1 and H2 are 
supported. H3 and H5 are partially supported, And H4 
is not supported.  
 
Discussion 
Coercive power and coordinated power (Non-coercive 
power) have shown significant positive influence on 
information sharing in e-government in China. Results 
show that government employees would like to provide 
and share information with other departments 
regardless of power type. Meanwhile, the results also 
show that the coordinated power’s impact on 
information sharing is greater than the impact of 
coercive power, which is different from our intuition. 
That means the main concern of information sharing is 
the possible mutual beneficial cooperation, regardless 
of the possible punishment and accountability. 
The interaction effect of trust on coercive power is not 
significant. Trust does not seem to affect coercive 
power’s influence on information sharing. Coercive 
power is based on the ability to give punishment. No 
matter whether the trust relation is established or not, 
an information provider will share information to avoid 
the possible punishment.  
Trust really has a positive effect on the relation 
between coordinated power and information sharing. It 
shows that the trust will increase the intention to share 
information. The trust-based relationship will reduce 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviors and enhance 
the influence of coordinated power. In order to 
motivate information sharing, government agencies 
should try to establish a mechanism to support building 
trust relationship with others. 
Perceived risk doesn’t have the significant effect on the 
relation between power and information sharing. That 
means the hypothesis H4 is not supported. This is 
related to the data source. The questionnaires are 
collected from government ministries. In China, all the 
ministries set up a safe information network and have 
very strict regulations on safety protection. Thus, the 
perceived risk is not a big concern in the information 
sharing process. 
Finally, power games do not show significant influence 
on the coercive power’s impact on information sharing. 
The employees would like to enlarge their control on 
the organization through the power from their owned or 
accessible information, but that will not influence 
government employees’ intention to share or hide their 
information resulted from coercive power. Power 
games are shown to have a significant positive 
interaction effect on the coordinated power’s impact on 
information sharing. Information is the source of power. 
In order to keep their advantages, some staff will not 
share their own information. But government 
employees know the rules of power games, and they 
understand the potential consequence for not sharing 
information. In fact, when they share information with 
other agencies, they can get positive response and 
receive information they want. Thus they can enhance 
their influence and control in the organization.  
 
Conclusion 
Information sharing could offer benefits for a 
government. Based on the result of previous research, 
this paper discusses the influential factors on 
information sharing in e-government from a unique 
administrative power perspective. The power is divided 
into coercive power and coordinated power. 
Meanwhile, trust, perceived risk, and power games 
were examined as moderator variables that either 
promote or mitigate the impact of the power. We tested 
the hypotheses through the distribution of a survey 
questionnaire to five ministries in China.  
The survey results demonstrate that the coercive power 
and coordinated power have a significant positive 
impact on information sharing in e-government. The 
coordinate power’s influence is greater than that of 
coercive power. Moreover, trust among employees and 
power games have the positive interaction effect on 
coord ated power’s effect on information sharing. in
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